“...knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting”
29. Ibid., 200.
31. *Beyond Good and Evil*, 262.
33. *The Gay Science*, 148. It is also to an anemia of *Entstehung of Buddhism and Christianity*, 347.
37. *The Gay Science*, III.
41. Ibid.
42. See “What Is an Author?” on rediscoveries.
43. This statement is echoed in Foucault’s discursive *Archaeology of Knowledge*, pp. 130-131, 206; or the usage of “Transgression”.
47. *Human, All Too Human*, 16.
48. See “Theatrum Philosophicum” for an analysis of difference.
49. *Twilight*, 44.
51. *The Wanderer*, 188. (This conception underlies *The Birth of the Clinic* even though it is not until *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, for a discussion especially p. 131.)
53. See “Intellectuals and Power.”
55. *Beyond Good and Evil*, 223.
57. *Human, All Too Human*, 274.
61. Ibid., 429.
Notes

1. See Nietzsche’s preface to *The Genealogy of Morals*, 4, 7.
(Schwarzkünstler is a black magician.)
10. *Human, All Too Human*, aphorism 92 was entitled *Ursprung der Gerechtigkeit*.
11. In the main body of *The Genealogy*, *Ursprung* and *Herkunft* are used interchangeably in numerous instances (I, 2; II, 8, 11, 12, 16, 17.)
13. *Human, All Too Human*, 34.
23. *Beyond Good and Evil*, 244.

Dear Friends,

I read these texts earlier than I was recommended, and loved it. It seemed to be in conversation with everything I’ve read recently (D&G, other Foucault), and I thought ideas much clearer (the argument against linearity). I don’t pretend to be an expert in surrounding material as well, but I still got a lot out of reading them, and the other half of texts, I liked them so much that I spent a week retyping them (OCR thought I’d send them out it or not, just leave it on the computer somewhere afterwards.

Two notes: Althusser was a fuck, and so was the text; I did not use accent marks. Sorry.
THE UNDERGROUND CURRENT OF THE MATERIALISM OF THE ENCOUNTER

(a partial document, excerpted from The Philosophy of the Encounter)

It is raining.

Let this book therefore be, before all else, a book about ordinary rain.

Malebranche wondered ‘why it rains upon sands, upon highways and seas’ since this water from the sky which, elsewhere, waters crops (and that is very good), adds nothing to the water of the sea, or goes to waste on the roads and beaches.

Our concern will not be with that kind of rain, providential or anti-providential. Quite the contrary: this book is about another kind of rain, about a profound theme which runs through the whole history of philosophy and was contested and repressed there as soon as it was stated: the ‘rain’ (Lucretius) of Epicurus’ atoms that fall parallel to each other in the void; the ‘rain’ of the parallelism of the infinite attributes in Spinoza and many others: Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, Marx, Heidegger too, and Derrida.

and light or to end on the sands? The great problems of nineteenth-century philosophy and Hegel (the reciprocal basis of truth and absolute knowledge), with the truth of absolute knowledge may well form a part of our concern. This does not mean, in terms of a critical perspective, that truth is limited by the intrinsic finitude of cognition, of limitations and all claim to truth in the absolute subject of knowledge. “It may be that the idea which might be made to prevail over another idea might overcome the most victorious: this is the problem of the horizon, only the desire for truth, which could direct and sustain such a sacrifice, is too great. Of course, this problem has always been with us.”

The Untimely Meditations discussed the treatment of the past, its decisive cut through of traditional attitudes of reverence, its discarding him with other origins than those of itself. Nietzsche, however, reproached external sources from every real source and for sacrificing the exclusive concern for truth. Sometimes Nietzsche reconsiders this line of thought and rectifies it to altogether different ends. It is by the past in the name of a truth that he sacrifices the present; but risking the destruction of the truth in the endless deployment of the present.

In a sense, genealogy returns to the theme Nietzsche recognized in 1874. It returns to the dejections that Nietzsche raised in the narrative powers of life. But they are metamorphosed: monuments becomes parody; the resistance becomes systematic dissolution; the critique is turned to a truth held by men in the present by the man who maintains knowledge by the weapon of knowledge.
our native land, native language, or the laws that govern us, its intention is to reveal the heterogenous systems which, masked by the self, inhibit the formation of any form of identity.

The third use of history is the sacrifice of the subject of knowledge. In appearance, or rather, according to the mask it bears, historical consciousness is neutral, devoid of passions, and committed solely to truth. But if it examines itself and if, more generally, it interrogates the various forms of scientific consciousness in its history, it finds that all these forms and transformations are aspects of the will to knowledge: instinct, passion, the inquisitor’s devotion, cruel subtlety, and malice. It discovers the violence of a position that sides against those who are happy in their ignorance, against the effective illusions by which humanity protects itself, a position that encourages the dangers of research and delights in disturbing discoveries. The historical analysis of this rancorous will to knowledge reveals that all knowledge rests on injustice (that there is no right, not even in the act of knowing, to truth or a foundation for truth) and that the instinct for knowledge is malicious (something murderous, opposed to the happiness of mankind.) Even in the greatly expanded form it assumes today, the will to knowledge does not achieve a universal truth; man is not given an exact and serene mastery of nature. On the contrary, it ceaselessly multiplies the risks, creates dangers in every area; it breaks down illusory defenses; it dissolves the unity of the subject; it releases those elements of itself that are devoted to its subversion and destruction. Knowledge does not slowly detach itself from its empirical roots, the initial needs from which it arose, to become pure speculation subject only to the demands of reason; its development is not tied to the constitution and affirmation of a free subject; rather, it creates a progressive enslavement to its instinctive violence. Where religions once demanded the sacrifice of bodies, knowledge now calls for experimentation on ourselves; it calls us to the sacrifice of the subject of knowledge. “The desire for knowledge has been transformed among us into a passion which fears no sacrifice, which fears nothing but its own extinction. It may be that mankind will eventually perish from this passion for knowledge. If not through passion, then through weakness. We must be prepared to state our choice: do we wish humanity to end in fire that is the first point which—revealingly, I would like to bring out: the existence of a materialist tradition in the history of philosophy: to have some word to distinguish it as a theoretical encounter, the take [prise]. I shall develop matters, let us say, for now, a materialism before of the aleatory and of contingency, as a wholly different mode of thought, cord, including that widely ascribed to Nietzsche like every other materialism in the rationalism of necessity and teleology, that is to say of idealism.

The fact that this materialism of the encounter the philosophical tradition does not mean it: it was too dangerous for that. Thus is it repressed, and perverted into an idealism raining down parallel to each other in the men, the existence of human freedom. Obviously, producing this misreading, to preclude any other reading of the reading the materialism of the encounter. With this misreading, idealist interpretations can question is just the clinamen or all of it: Spinoza and Hobbes, the Rousseau of even Heidegger (to the extent that Heidegger) What triumphs in these interpretations philosophy and the history of philosophy in the Western, because it has presided over and also logocentric, because it identifies of the Logos charged with thinking the reality.

To free the materialism of the encounter cover, if possible, its implications for
ism; and to ascertain its hidden effects wherever they are silently at work—such is the task that I have set myself here.

We can start with a surprising comparison: between Epicurus and Heidegger.

Epicurus tells us that, before the formation of the world, an infinity of atoms were falling parallel to each other in the void. They still are. This implies both that, before the formation of the world, there was nothing, and also that all the elements of the world existed from all eternity, before any world that ever was. It also implies that, before the formation of the world, there was no Meaning, neither Cause nor End nor Reason nor unreason. The non-anteriority of Meaning is one of Epicurus’ basic theses, by virtue of which he stands opposed to both Plato and Aristotle. Then the clinamen supervenes. I shall leave it to the specialists to decide who introduced the concept of the clinamen, present in Lucretius but absent from the fragments of Epicurus. The fact that this concept was ‘introduced’ suggests that it proved indispensable, if only on reflection, to the ‘logic’ of Epicurus’ theses. The clinamen is an infinitesimal swerve, ‘as small as possible’; ‘no one knows where, or when, or how’ it occurs, or what causes an atom to ‘swerve’ from its vertical fall in the void, and breaking the parallelism in an almost negligible way at one point, induce an encounter with the atom next to it, and, from encounter to encounter, a pile-up and the birth of a world—that is to say, of the agglomeration of atoms induced, in a chain reaction, by the initial swerve and encounter.

The idea that the origin of every world, and therefore of all reality and all meaning, is due to a swerve, and that Swerve, not Reason or Cause, is the origin of the world, gives some sense of the audacity of Epicurus’ thesis. What other philosophy has, in the history of philosophy, defended the thesis that Swerve was originary, not derived? We must go further still. In order for swerve to give rise to an encounter from which a world is born, that encounter must last; it must be, not a ‘brief encounter’, but a lasting encounter, which then becomes the basis for all reality, all necessity, all Meaning and all reason. But the encounter can also not last; then there is no world. What is more, it is clear that history”: a history given to reestablishing development and their maintenance in a personal essence. But in 1874, Nietzsche totally devoted to veneration, of barrin...
will the historical sense free itself from the demands of a suprahistorical history.

7. The historical sense gives rise to three uses that oppose and correspond to the three Platonic modalities of history. The first is parodic, directed against reality, and opposes the theme of history as reminiscence or recognition; the second is disassociative, directed against identity, and opposes history given as continuity or representative of a tradition; the third is sacrificial. Directed against truth, and opposes history as knowledge. They imply a use of history that severs its connection to memory, its metaphysical and anthropological model, and constructs a counter-memory—a transformation of history into a totally different form of time.

First, the parodic and farcical use. The historian offers this confused and anonymous European, who no longer knows himself or what name he should adopt, the possibility of alternate identities, more individualized and substantial than his own. But the man with historical sense will see that this substitution is simply a disguise. Historians supplied the Revolution with Roman prototypes, romanticism with knight’s armor, and the Wagnerian era was given the sword of a German hero—ephemeral props that point to our own unreality. No one kept them from venerating these religions, from going to Bayreuth to commemorate a new afterlife; they were free, as well, to be transformed into street-vendors of empty identities. The new historian, the genealogist, will know what to make of this masquerade. He will not be too serious to enjoy it; on the contrary, he will push the masquerade to its limit and prepare the great carnival of rime where masks are constantly reappearing. No longer the identification of our faint individuality with the solid identities of the past, but our “unrealization” through the excessive choice of identities—Frederick of Hohenstaufen, Caesar, Jesus, Dionysus, and possibly Zarathustra. Taking up these masks, revitalizing the buffoonery of history, we adopt an identity whose unreality surpasses that of God who started the charade. “Perhaps, we can discover a realm where originality is again possible as parodists of history and buffoons of God.”55 In this, we recognize the parodic double of what the second of the Un timely Meditations called “monumental his-

All this may be stated differently. The accomplished fact (fait accompli) in which, once the established the reign of Reason, Means. But the accomplishment of the fact is just a point; it depends on the aleatory encounter of the clinamen. Before the accomplishment of the world, there is only the non-accomplishment, is merely the unreal existence of the atom.

What becomes of philosophy under this parodic tendency in the thought of Heidegger a moment ago? nothing but agglomerated atoms, but the atoms themselves, which, without swerve and abstract elements, lacking all consiste that we can say that the atoms’ very existence, and the encounter prior to which they led

I mentioned Heidegger a moment ago. He is neither an Epicurian nor an atomist. It is well known of the Origin, or of the Cause and End. Heidegger a long series of developments—es gibt—‘there is’, ‘this is what is given’—inspiration. ‘There is world and matter, a
of the *es gibt*, of the ‘this is what is given,’ makes short shrift of all the classic questions about the Origin, and so on. And it ‘opens up’ a prospect that restores a kind of transcendental contingency of the world, into which we are ‘thrown’, and of the meaning of the world, which in turn points to the opening up of Being, the original urge of Being, its ‘destining’, beyond which there is nothing to seek or to think. Thus the world is a ‘gift’ that we have been given, the ‘fact of the fact’ [*fait de fait*] that we have not chosen, and it ‘opens up’ before us in the facticity of its contingency, and even beyond this facticity, in what is not merely an observation, but a ‘being-in-the-world’ that commands all possible Meaning. ‘*Dasein* is the shepherd of being.’ Everything depends on the *da*. What remains of philosophy? Once again—but in the transcendental mode—the *observation of the ‘es gibt’* and its presuppositions, or, rather, its effects in their insurmountable ‘givenness’.

Is this still materialism? The question is not very meaningful for Heidegger, who deliberately takes up a position outside the great divisions and the terminology of Western philosophy. But then are Epicurus’ theses still materialist? Yes, perhaps, doubtless, but on condition that we are always done with a conception of materialism which, setting out from the questions and concepts it shares with idealism, makes materialism the response to idealism. We continue to talk about a materialism of the encounter only for the sake of convenience: it should be borne in mind that this materialism of the encounter includes Heidegger and eludes the classical criteria of every materialism, and that we need, after all, some word to designate the thing.

Machiavelli will be our second witness in the history of the underground current of the materialism of the encounter. His project is well-known: to think, in the impossible conditions of fifteenth-century Italy, the conditions for establishing an Italian national state. All the circumstances favorable to imitating France or Spain exist, but without connections between them: a divided and fervent people, the fragmentation of Italy into small obsolete states that have been condemned by history, a generalized but disorderly revolt of an entire world against foreign occupation and pillage, and a profound, latent aspiration of the people to unity, an aspiration to which all the great works of the land of interminglings and bastardy, the ‘cruel and unnatural nature.’ We have become barbarians with the decadence of high civilization: cities in ruin and empty before us; we stop before gaping wounds in these empty temples. Great epochs lack successive deference; they ignored their predecessors and ignored Shakespeare. The decadence of the spectacle (while stronger periods refined it) and the nature of this scene is to represent our own making, which properly crowed scenes. But there is more. Europeans; they ignore their own past, they lack individuality; we can begin to understand the specific bent of the nineteenth century: the mixtures that effaced all its individual traits as the mortification of asceticism; its insatiable artistic works, and its need to rely on the base curiosity of plebs.

If this fully represents the genealogy of *a new* form of a demagogic or religious kind of roles on the same stage? Only by being against its birth. And it is this movement, the specific nature of the Entstehung: it is revision of a long preparation, but a scene of chance of confrontations, where they can also be confiscated. The locus of this surely Athenian demagogy, the vulgar signs in immortality, and Plato could have seen to turn it against itself. Undoubtedly, he but his defeat lies in its consecration. The nineteenth century: to avoid doing for historians what Plato did for Socrates. The thing it produced; it is necessary to genealogical uses, that is, strictly ant
things that should be repugnant to him. His apparent serenity follows from his concerted avoidance of the exceptional and his reduction of all things to the lowest common denominator. Nothing is allowed to stand above him; and underlying his desire for total knowledge is his search for the secrets that belittle everything: “base curiosity.” What is the source of history? It comes from the plebs. To whom is it addressed? To the plebs. And its discourse strongly resembles the demagogue’s refrain: “No one is greater than you and anyone who presumes to get the better of you—you who are good—is evil.” The historian, who functions as his double, is heard to echo: “No past is greater than your present, and, through my meticulous erudition, I will rid you of your infatuations and transform the grandeur of history into pettiness, evil, and misfortune.” The historian’s ancestry goes back to Socrates. This demagogy, of course, must be masked. It must hide its singular malice under the cloak of universals. As the demagogue is obliged to invoke truth, laws of essences, and eternal necessity, the historian must invoke objectivity, the accuracy of facts, and the permanence of the past. The demagogue denies the body to secure the sovereignty of a timeless idea and the historian effaces his proper individuality so that others may enter the stage and reclaim their own speech. He is divided against himself: forced to silence his preferences and overcome his distaste, to blur his own perspective and replace it with the fiction of a universal geometry, to mimic death in order to enter the kingdom of the dead, to adopt a faceless anonymity. In this world where he has conquered his individual will, he becomes a guide to the inevitable law of a superior will. Having curbed the demands of his individual will in his knowledge, he will disclose the form of an eternal will in his object of study. The objectivity of historians inverts the relationships of will and knowledge and it is, in the same stroke, a necessary belief in Providence, in final causes and teleology—the beliefs that place the historian in the family of ascetics. “I can’t stand these lustful eunuchs of history, all the seductions of an ascetic ideal; I can’t stand these whitened sepulchres producing life or those tired and indifferent beings who dress up in the part of wisdom, and adopt an objective point of view.”54

The *Entsehung* of history is found in nineteenth-century Europe: the period bear witness, including that of Dumas. In all this, but was waiting for the arrival of an atomized country, every atom of which without encountering its neighbor. It was for a swerve, and thus an encounter, if I may. How was this to be done? Machiavelli suggested that the existing states—and, in particular, any one of all—could play the role of unifier. In turn the next, but only to reject them as alibis and captives. And he possessed a stark simplicity.

Once all the states and their princes—both have been rejected, Machiavelli, using Cesare moves on to the idea that unification would some nameless man who has enough lust, somewhere, in some nameless corner of this atomic point, gradually aggregate a grand project of founding a national history line of reasoning, which leaves positions the Federator and that of the region with the play for the constitution of this federation. The gaming table, which is itself empty (but

In order for this encounter between a nameless man and the existing states and princes, Machiavelli and this place. But let us not be fooled into the condition for the encounter. Machiavelli’s wizened Italy, the encounter should take place with this Cesare, who, starting out within the Kingdom, and, after taking Florence, was to play Italy if he had not been stricken by fever at the critical moment, when he was heading itself, to strip him of his office. *A man nothing starting out from an unassignable place.*
conditions for regeneration.

In order for this encounter to take place, however, another encounter must come about: that of fortune and virtu in the Prince. Encountering Fortuna, the Prince must have the virtu to treat her as he would treat a woman, to welcome her in order to seduce or do violence to her; in short, to use her to realize his destiny. [sic] Thanks to this consideration, we owe Machiavelli a whole philosophical theory of the encounter between fortune and virtu. The encounter may not take place or may take place. The meeting can be missed. The encounter can be brief or lasting; he needs an encounter that lasts. To make it last, the Prince has to learn to govern fortune by governing men. He has to structure his state by training up its men, commingling them in the army (see Gramsci), and, above all, by endowing this state with constant laws. He had to win them over by accommodating them, while knowing how to keep his distance. This dual procedure gives rise to the theory of seduction and the theory of fear, as well as the theory of the ruse. I leave aside the rejection of the demagoguery of love, the idea that fear is preferable to love, and the violent methods designed to inspire fear, in order to go straight to the theory of the ruse.

Should the prince be good or wicked? He has to learn to be wicked, but in all circumstances he has to know to appear to be good, to possess the moral virtues that will win the people over to his side, even if they earn him the hatred of the mighty, whom he despises, for, from them, nothing else is to be expected. Machiavelli’s theory is well-known: the prince should be ‘like the centaur of the Ancients, both man and beast’. But it has not been sufficiently remarked that the beast divides into two in Machiavelli, becoming both lion and fox, and that, ultimately, it is the fox who governs everything. For it is the fox who obliges the Prince either to appear to be evil or to appear to be good—in a word, to fabricate a popular (ideological) image of himself that either does or does not answer to his interests and those of the ‘little man’. Consequently, the Prince is governed, internally, by the variations of this other aleatory encounter, that of the fox on the one hand and the lion and the man on the other. This encounter may not take place, but it also may take place. It has to last long enough for the figure of the prince heights and degenerations, poisons and a curative science.51

The final trait of effective history is its perspective. Historians take unusual pains to work which reveal their grounding in a controversy—the unavoidable system of injurious traces in order to give equal weight to their own sight and the historical sense, knowledge is allowed to express itself in cognition; and “wirkliche Geschichte” as the vertical projection of its counter-curse.50

6. In this context, Nietzsche links the historian’s history. They share a beginning that fused, share the same sign in which they recognized as well as the seed of an eventual common genealogy.

The descent (Herkunft) of the historian’s birth. A characteristic of history is to be understood and excluded qualities to all things without distinction, a common process of exclusion. Nothing must escape it, and nothing be excluded. Historians argue that this is not given to a discreet effacement but does not submit itself to their process. It does not submit itself to their process, giving equal weight to its own sight and its historical sense, knowledge is allowed to express itself in cognition; and “wirkliche Geschichte” as the vertical projection of its counter-curse.
We want historians to confirm our belief that the present rests upon profound intentions and immutable necessities. But the true historical sense confirms our existence among countless lost events, without a landmark or a point of reference.

Effective history can also invert the relationship that traditional history, in its dependence on metaphysics, establishes between proximity and distance. The latter is given to a contemplation of distances and heights: the noblest periods, the highest forms, the most abstract ideas, the purest individualities. It accomplishes this by getting as near as possible, placing itself at the foot of its mountain peaks, at the risk of adopting the famous perspective of frogs. Effective history, on the other hand, shortens its vision to those things nearest to it—the body, the nervous system, nutrition, digestion, and energies; it unearths the periods of decadence and if it chances upon loft epochs, it is with the suspicion—not vindictive but joyous—of finding a barbarous and shameful confusion. It has no fear of looking down, so long as it is understood that it looks from above and descends to seize the various perspectives, to disclose dispersions and differences, to leave things undisturbed in their own dimension and intensity. It reverses the surreptitious practice of historians, their pretension to examine things furthest from themselves, the grovelling manner in which they approach this promising distance (like the metaphysicians who proclaim the existence of an afterlife, Situated at a distance from this world, as a promise of their reward.) Effective history studies what is closest, but in an abrupt dispossession, so as to seize it at a distance (an approach similar to that of a doctor who looks closely, who plunges to make a diagnosis and to state its difference.) Historical sense has more in common with medicine than philosophy; and it should not surprise us that Nietzsche occasionally employs the phrase “historically and physiologically,” since among the philosopher’s idiosyncrasies is a complete denial of the body. This includes, as well, “the absence of historical sense, a hatred for the idea of development, Egyptianism,” the obstinate “placing of conclusions at the beginning,” of “making last things first.” History has a more important task that to be a handmaiden to philosophy, to recount the necessary birth of truth and values; it should become a differential knowledge of energies and failings, to ‘take hold’ among the people—to ‘take hold’ among the people—to ‘take hold’ among the people.

The reader may object that this is merely looking the fact that a philosophy is simple-minded. A curious philosophy which is a ‘materialist of politics,’ and which, as such, does not place in the political void that the encounter of rational unity must ‘take hold’. But this is a vain void. No Cause that precedes its effects. No principle of morality or theology (as in the condition: the good and bad forms of governance, the good into the bad.) One reasons history of the accomplished fact, but in the face of fact to be accomplished. As in the Epistemology, are both here and beyond, to come rather [pleinoir] (see above, the Italian situation) abstract, as long as the unity of a world encounter that will endow them with existence.

It will have been noticed that, in this alternative: the encounter may not take place. Nothing determines, no principle of determinism in advance; it is of the order of a dice will never abolish chance.’ Indeed, this is not brief, but lasts, never guarantees tomorrow rather than come undone. In other words, nothing determines, no principle of the accomplished fact is the guarantee of the encounter, for it is true: every accomplished fact, even an absolute unity in the ‘laws’ of any world or any state.
manent revocation of the accomplished fact by another undecipherable fact to be accomplished, without knowing in advance whether, or when, or how the event that revokes it will come about. Simply, one day new hands will have to be dealt out and the dice thrown again on the empty table.

Thus it will have been noticed that this philosophy is, in sum, a philosophy of the void: not only the philosophy which says that the void pre-exists the atoms that fall in it, but a philosophy which creates the philosophical void [fait la vide philosophique] in order to endow itself with existence: a philosophy which, rather than setting out from the famous ‘philosophical problems’ (why is there something rather than nothing?), begins by evacuating all philosophical problems, hence by refusing to assign itself any ‘object’ whatever (‘philosophy has no object’) in order to set out from nothing, and from the infinitesimal, aleatory variation of nothing constituted by the swerve of the fall. Is there a more radical critique of all philosophy, with its pretension to utter the truth about things? Is there a more striking way of saying that philosophy’s ‘object’ par excellence is nothingness, nothing, or the void? In the seventeenth century, Pascal repeatedly approached this idea, and the possibility of introducing the void as a philosophical object. He did so, however, in the deplorable context of an apologetics. Here, too, it was only with Heidegger, after the false words of a Hegel (‘the labor of the negative’) or a Stirner (‘all things are nothing to me’), that the void was given all its decisive philosophical significance again. Yet we already find all this in Epicurus and Machiavelli: in Machiavelli, we evacuated [† le vide de] all Plato and Aristotle’s philosophical concepts in order to think the possibility of making Italy a national state. One measures the impact of philosophy here—reactionary or revolutionary—despite the often baffling outward appearances, which have to be patiently and carefully deciphered.

If Machiavelli is read along these lines (the foregoing are just brief notes which have to be developed, and which I hope to some day), how is it possible to imagine that his work is, under its political cloak, anything other than an authentically philosophical body of thought? And how is it possible to imagine that the fascination exercised by
ism.” On the other hand, the historical sense can evade metaphysics and become a privileged instrument of genealogy if it refuses the certainty of absolutes. Given this, it corresponds to the acuity of a glance that distinguishes, separates, and disperses, that is capable of liberating divergence and marginal elements—the kind of dissociating view that is capable of decomposing itself, capable of shattering the unity of man’s being through which it was thought that he could extend his sovereignty to the events of his past.

Historical meaning becomes a dimension of “wirkliche Historie” to the extent that it places within a process of development everything considered immortal in man. We believe that feelings are immutable, but every sentiment, particularly the noblest and most disinterested, has a history. We believe in the dull constancy of instinctual life and imagine that it continues to exert its force indiscriminately in the present as it did in the past. But a knowledge of history easily disintegrates this unity, depicts its wavering course, locates its moments of strength and weakness, and defines its oscillating reign. It easily seizes the slow elaboration of instincts and those movements where, in turning upon themselves, they relentlessly set about their self-destruction. We believe, in any event, that the body obeys the exclusive laws of physiology and that it escapes the influence of history, but this too is false. The body is molded by a great many distinct regimes; it is broken down by the rhythms of work, rest, and holidays; it is poisoned by food or values, through eating habits or moral laws; it constructs resistances. “Effective” history differs from traditional history in being without constants. Nothing in man—not even his body—is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for recognizing other men. The traditional devices for constructing a comprehensive view of history and for retracing the past as a patient and continuous development must be systematically dismantled. Necessarily, we must dismiss those tendencies that encourage the consoling play of recognitions. Knowledge, even under the banner of history, does not depend on “rediscovery,” and it emphatically excludes the “rediscovery of ourselves.” History becomes “effective” to the degree that it introduces discontinuity into our very being—as it divides our emotions, dramatizes our instincts, multiplies our body and sets it against itself. “Ef-

Machiavelli has been merely political, or the notion of where he was a monarchist or a political philosophy of the Enlightenment was en
couraged when the philosophical resonances of his name were associated to Machiavelli himself, among the most prominent figures of this painful past? I would like to offer a challenge not simply the meaningless nega
tive, but also the widespread thesis that Machiavelli stands as the founding stone of modern political science. I would like to suggest, then, that the fascination his ‘materialism of the encounter’ that Machiavelli has had on people who do not need, and rightly so—no one is obliged to ‘engage’ with him, vainly striving to pin down the elusive source of this eternally incompre

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Here. I shall defend the thesis that, for Spinoza, philosophy is the void. This is a paradoxical statement that many concepts that are worked out in it. 

notice how Spinoza begins. He confesses in the first place of things back to God, who starts with the thinking subject and creates things back to the dubito and God and brings this the void that leads through God. Spinoza shun

Machiavelli has been merely political, or the notion of where he was a monarchist or a political philosophy of the Enlightenment was encouraged when the philosophical resonances of his name were associated to Machiavelli himself, among the most prominent figures of this painful past? I would like to offer a challenge not simply the meaningless negative, but also the widespread thesis that Machiavelli stands as the founding stone of modern political science. I would like to suggest, then, that the fascination his ‘materialism of the encounter’ that Machiavelli has had on people who do not need, and rightly so—no one is obliged to ‘engage’ with him, vainly striving to pin down the elusive source of this eternally incomprehensible fascination. Someone understood this fascination long before Machiavelli’s death. His name was Spinoza. I have high praise for Machiavelli, mentioned above, but let the subject, once again, would appear to be modernity philosophy as well. In order to grasp the full world and was stalked by adversaries who occupied all the high ground, which dominates all the controversy. Moreover, he had to develop a discourse that led through God. Spinoza shun...
takes up his position in God. Hence one can say that he occupies, in advance, the common fortress, the ultimate guarantee and last recourse of all his adversaries, by starting with this beyond-which-there-is-nothing, which, because it thus exists in the absolute, with absence of all relation, is itself nothing. Saying that one ‘begins with God’, or the Whole, or the unique substance, and making it understood that one ‘begins with nothing’, is, basically, the same thing: what difference is there between the Whole and nothing?—since nothing exists outside the whole... What, for that matter, does Spinoza have to say about God? This is where the strangeness begins.

_Dues sive natura_, God is only nature. This comes down to saying that He is nothing else: He is only nature. Epicurus, too, set out from nature as that which outside nothing exists. What, then, is this Spinozist God? An absolute, unique, infinite substance, endowed with an infinite number of infinite attributes. This is obviously a way of saying that anything which can exist never exists anywhere other than in God, whether this ‘whatever’ is known or unknown. For we know only two attributes, extension and thought, and even then, we do not know all the powers of the body, just as, when it comes to thought, we do not know the unthought power of desire. The other attributes—of which there are an infinite number, and which are themselves infinite—are there to cover the whole range of the possible and impossible. The fact that there is an infinite number of them, and that they are unknown to us, leaves the door to their existence and their aleatory figures wide open. The fact that they are parallel, that here everything is an effect of parallelism, recalls Epicurus’ rain. The attributes fall in the empty space of their determination like raindrops that can undergo encounters [sont récontrables] only in this exceptional parallelism, this parallelism without encounter or union (of body and soul...) known as man, in this assignable but minute parallelism of thought and the body, which is still only parallelism, since, here as in all things, the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things. In sum, a parallelism without encounter, yet a parallelism that is already, in itself, encounter thanks to the very structure of the relationship between the different elements of each attribute.

The isolation of different points of entry, the successive configurations of an idea, result from substitutions, displacements, systematic reversals. If interpretation were being hidden in an origin, then only methodological development of humanity. But if interpretative appropriation of a system of essential meaning, in order to impose a will, to force its participation in a different system of secondary rules, then the development of interpretations. The role of genealogy is to reveal morals, ideals, and metaphysical concepts of liberty or of the ascetic life; as they are different interpretations, they must be marked at stage of historical process.

5. How can we define the relationship as the examination of Herkunft and Einzelne mental sense? We could, of course, ex post facto apostrophes against history, but we would need to consider those instances when “wirkliche Historie,” vor its more frequent “spirit” or “sense.” In fact, Nietzsche second of the Untimely Meditations, always encourages subjective recognitions and integration to all the displacements of the past on all that precedes it implies the end of a moment. The historian’s history tends to base its judgments on an apostrophe, however, because of its belief in the reality of the soul, and the nature of consciousness itself. Once the historical sense is master, perspective, metaphysics can bend it to its own demands of objective science, it...
endlessly repeated play of dominations. The domination of certain men over others leads to the differentiation of values; the forceful appropriation of things necessary to survival and the imposition of a duration not intrinsic to them account for the origin of logic. This relationship of domination is no more a “relationship” than the place where it occurs is a place; and, precisely for this reason, it is fixed, throughout its history, in rituals, in meticulous procedures that impose rights and obligations. It establishes marks of its power and engraves memories on things and even within bodies. It makes itself accountable for debts and gives rise to the universe of rules, which is by no means designed to temper violence, but rather to satisfy it. Following traditional beliefs, it would be false to think that total war exhausts itself in its own contradictions and ends by renouncing violence and submitting to civil laws. On the contrary, the law is a calculated and relentless pleasure, delight in the promised blood, which permits the perpetual instigation of new dominations and the staging of meticulously repeated scenes of violence. The desire for peace, the serenity of compromise, and the tacit acceptance of the law, far from representing a major moral conversion or a utilitarian calculation that gave rise to the law, are but its result and, in point of fact, its perversion: “guilt, conscience, and duty had their threshold of emergence in the right to secure obligations; and their inception, like that of any major event on earth, was saturated in blood.” Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination. The nature of these rules allows violence to be inflicted on violence and the resurgence of new forces that are sufficiently strong to dominate those in power. Rules are empty in themselves, violent and unfinalized; they are impersonal and can be bent to any purpose. The successes of history belong to those who are capable of seizing these rules, to replace those who had used them, to disguise themselves so as to pervert them, invert their meaning, and redirect them against those who had initially imposed them; controlling this complex mechanism, they will make it function so as to overcome the rulers through their own rules.

One cannot assess this unless one perceives of this strategy and this parallelism. There is nothing but nature, and that this natural, infinite number of parallel attributes, is not to say about God, but that there is also not the problem that invaded all of Western philosophy, especially, Descartes: the problem of knowledge, the knowing subject and the known object are the cause of so much discussion, and, perhaps, of an identity, ‘man thinks’, that is just how it is. The facticity, that of the ‘this is how it is,’ anticipates Heidegger and recalls the first Epicurian. Thought is simply the success of substituting ‘thought’, and refers us, not to a Self requires, to the succession of the mode.

Also interesting is the way in which the transition takes place. That he starts to think by thinking containment, until these elements at last ‘take’ form, by thinking singular essences” (from the first kind to the second kind of reflection guaranteeing this transition from confused thinking. There is no subject, no awareness of all things, have been reduced or, above all, religion. Better: a theory of
long before Nietzsche, destroys them right down to their imaginary foundations of “reversal”—the “inverted fabrica” (see the appendix to Book I of the *Ethics*). 24 No more finality (whether psychological or historical.) In short, *the void that is philosophy itself*. And inasmuch as this result is a result, it is attained only after an immense amount of labor, which makes for all the interest of the *Ethics*, has been performed on concepts: “critical labor”, as it is usually called; a labor of “deconstruction”, as Derrida would say, following Heidegger. For what is destroyed is simultaneously reconstructed, but on other foundations and in accordance with an altogether different plan—witness the inexhaustible theory of the imagination or the imaginary, which both destroys and reconstructs the theory of knowledge, the theory of religion, the theory of history, and so on—but in their actual, political functions.

A strange theory, which people tend to present as a theory of knowledge (the first of the three kinds), whereas *the imagination is not by any means a faculty, but, fundamentally, only the only world itself in its “givenness”*. With this slide [glissement], Spinoza not only turns his back on all theories of knowledge, but also clears a path for the recognition of the “world” as that-beyond-which-there-is-nothing, not even a theory of nature—for the recognition of the “world” as a unique totality that is not totalized, but experienced in its dispersion, and experienced as the “given” illusions [fabricae]. Basically, the theory of the first kind as a “world” corresponds distantly, yet very precisely, to the thesis that God is “nature”, since nature is nothing but the world thought in accordance with ordinary notions, but given before them, as that prior to which there is nothing. For Spinoza, politics is then grafted on to the world’s imaginary and necessary myths. Thus Spinoza converges with Machiavelli in his profoundest conclusions and his rejection of all the presuppositions of traditional philosophy, the autonomy of the political being nothing other than the form taken by the rejection of all finality, all religion and all transcendence. But the theory of the imaginary as a world allows Spinoza to think the “singular essence” of the third kind, which finds its representation par excellence in the history of an individual or a people, such as Moses or the Jewish people. The fact that it is necessary means simply that it has been accomplished, but ev-

realize itself as a species, as something, unity, uniformity, and simplicity of its form, perpetual struggle against outsiders or the from within.” On the other hand, indivi-
other stage of the relationship of force, victorious and when it is no longer the condition, we find a struggle “of egoi-
each bursting forth in a splintering of the sun and for the light.”31 There tends against itself, and not only in the
which allows it to divide itself, but at the Force reacts against its growing lassitude,
poses limits, inflicts torments and mo-
tions as a higher morality, and, in exclu-
this manner, the ascetic ideal was born
life which...struggles for its own existence
movement in which the Reformation and
was least corrupt;33 German Catholicism
ained enough strength to turn against
and history, and to spiritualize itself into
Emergence is thus the entry of force
from the wings to center stage, each in
Nietzsche calls the Entsehungsherd of the
specifically the energy of the strong or
precisely this scene where they are dis-
face. It is nothing but the space that on
which they exchange their threatening
descent qualifies the strength or wea-
scription on a body, emergence design-
but not as a closed field offering the
equals. Rather, as Nietzsche demonstrates,
evil, it is a “non place,” a pure distance
ories do not belong to a common space. O-
sible for an emergence; no one can glor-
the interstice.

In a sense, only a single drama is ever
soil—is the domain of the *Herkunft*. The body manifests the stigmata of past experience and also gives rise to desires, failings, and errors. These elements may join in a body where they achieve a sudden expression, but as often, their encounter is an engagement in which they efface each other, where the body becomes the pretext of their insurmountable conflict. The body is the inscribed surface of events (traced by language and dissolved by ideas), the locus of a dissociated Self (adopting the illusion of a substantial unity), and a volume in perpetual disintegration. Genealogy, as an analysis of descent, is thus situated within the articulation of the body and history. Its task is to expose a body totally imprinted by history and the process of history’s destruction of the body.

4. *Entstehung* designates emergence, the moment of arising. It stands as the principle and the singular law of an apparition. As it is wrong to search for descent in an uninterrupted continuity, we should avoid thinking of emergence as the final term of an historical development; the eye was not always intended for contemplation, and punishment has had other purposes than setting an example. These developments may appear as a culmination, but they are merely the current episodes in a series of subjugations: the eye initially responded to the requirements of hunting and warfare; and punishment has been subjected, throughout its history, to a variety of needs—revenge, excluding an aggressor, compensating a victim, creating fear. In placing present needs at the origin, the metaphysician would convince us of an obscure purpose that seeks its realization at the moment it arises. Genealogy, however, seeks to reestablish the various systems of subjection: not the anticipatory power of meaning, but the hazardous play of dominations.

Emergence is always produced through a particular stage of forces. The analysis of the *Entstehung* must delineate this interaction, against adverse circumstances, and the attempt to avoid degeneration and regain strength by dividing these forces against themselves. It is in this sense that the emergence of a species (animal or human) and its solidification are secured “in an extended battle against conditions which are essentially and constantly unfavorable.” In fact, “the species must everything in it could have swung the other encounter or non-encounter of Moses and comprehension or non-comprehension of the limit-situation, of nothing itself, which everything to him for as long as you like.

Hobbes, that “devil” or “demon”, with the transition from Spinoza to Rousseau. All society is based on fear, Hobbes said, you have keys. What do you have keys for? attack from you don’t know whom: it may be your best friend, transformed into a “wolf” for the occasion and desire to enrich himself, which is worth as much as our best “value”, draws a whole philosophy: namely, that “the species mustcompetitors (whence the “passions” about which almost everyone loses, judging the general war: not that it breaks out, here would logically claim), but, rather, in the “the threat of an outbreak of foul weather time of the day or night, without warning threat against one’s life and possessions hangs, always, at every moment, over the fact that he lives in society. I am well aware of something very different from competition (as was once thought)—namely,
was a witness (one is not a contemporary of Cromwell and the execution of Charles I with impunity), in which he saw the equilibrium of the minor fear of the “keys” suddenly overturned in the face of the great fear of popular revolts and political murders. Beyond the shadow of a doubt, it is this great fear in particular that he means when he evokes the times of misfortune in which part of society could massacre the other in order to take power.

As a good theoretician of Natural Law, our Hobbes obviously does not restrict himself to these outward appearances, even if they are appalling; he wants to come to terms with the effects by tracing back to their causes, and therefore proceeds to give us a theory of the state of Nature as well. To reduce the state of Nature to its elements, one has to pursue the analysis down to the level of the “atoms of society” constituted by individuals endowed with conatus, that is, with the power and will “to persevere in their being” and create a void in front of themselves [faire le vide devant eux] in order to mark out the space of their freedom there. Atomized individuals, with the void as condition for their movement: this reminds us of something, does it not? Hobbes does indeed contend that freedom, which makes the whole individual and the force of his being, resides in the “void of impediments,” the “absence of impediments”29 in the path of his conquering power. An individual joins the war of all against all only out of a desire to avoid every obstacle that would prevent him from forging straight ahead (one thinks here of the atoms descending in free fall parallel to each other); basically, he would be happy to encounter no one at all in a world that would in that case be empty.

It is an unfortunate fact, however, that this world is full—full of people pursuing the same goal, who therefore confront each other in order to clear the way before their own conatus, but find no other means of attaining their end than “to bestow death upon” anyone who blocks their path. Whence the essential role of death in Hobbe’s thought, which is a thought of infinite life; the role not of accidental death, but of necessary death, bestowed and received by man; the role of economic and political murder, which alone is capable of [propre a] maintaining this society of the state of war in an unstable but necessary equilibrium. is an acquisition, a possession that grows unstable assemblage of faults, fissures, threaten the fragile inheritor from within, or instability in the minds of certain, of decorum, are the final consequences of logical inaccuracies, hasty conclusions, and for descent is not the erecting of foundations what was previously considered was thought unified; it shows the heterogeneity, consistent with itself. What convictions, knowledge can resist it? If a genealogical made—of one who collects facts and every Herkunft would quickly divulge the official pleadings of the lawyer—their father.28

Finally, descent attaches itself to the body, nervous system, in temperament, in the body of those whose ancestors committed to mistake effects for causes, believe in maintain the value of eternal truths, and will suffer. Cowardice and hypocrisy, for shoots of error: not in a Socratic sense of a mistake, not because of a turning away, because the body maintains, in life as in weakness, the sanction of every truth and verse manner, the origin—descent. Why subjective life? Why give a supreme value to maintain the absolute truth of those fifing barbarous ages...if the strength of a himself tired or sick, melancholy or stupid, without desire or appetite for a short time other man, that is, less dangerous. His power form as words or reflections. In this form, a thinker and prophet or used his imitations.”30 The body—and everything that
social type. But the traits it attempts to identify are not the exclusive generic characteristics of an individual, a sentiment, or an idea, which permit us to qualify them as “Greek” or “English”; rather, it seeks the subtle, singular, and subindividual marks that might possibly intersect in them to form a network that is difficult to unravel. Far from being a category of resemblance, this origin allows the sorting out of different traits: the Germans imagined that they had finally accounted for their complexity by saying they possessed a double soul; they were fooled by a simple computation, or rather, they were simply trying to master the racial disorder from which they had formed themselves. Where the soul pretends unification or the self fabricates a coherent identity, the genealogist sets out to study the beginning—numberless beginnings whose faint traces and hints of color are readily seen by an historical eye. The analysis of descent permits the dissociation of the self, its recognition and displacement as an empty synthesis, in liberating a profusion of lost events.

An examination of descent also permits the discovery, under the unique aspect of a trait or a concept, of the myriad events through which—thanks to which, against which—they were formed. Genealogy does not pretend to go back in time to restore an unbroken continuity of forgotten things; its duty is not to demonstrate that the past actively exists in the present, that it continues secretly to animate the present, having imposed a predetermined form to all its vicissitudes. Genealogy does not resemble the evolution of a species and does not map the destiny of a people. On the contrary, to follow the complex course of descent is to maintain passing events in their proper dispersion; it is to identify the accidents, the minute deviations or conversely, the complete reversals—the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us; it is to discover that truth or being do not lie at the root of what we know and what we are, but the exteriority of accidents. This from the moment it stops being pious and becomes a critique.

Deriving from such a source is a dangerous legacy. In numerous instances, Nietzsche associates the terms Herkunft and Erbschaft. Nevertheless, we should not be deceived into thinking that this heritage is mere “calculate”, weighing up the respective advantageous and disadvantageous state of war or entering into a contract based on the inalienable foundation of error. They reason, then, and eventually come to advantage to make a mutual pact, a compact, in which they pledge (as atomists) the omnipotent power of the one to whom all the authority has been invested and without receiving anything in return (natural rights): Leviathan—whether the monarchy or the omnipotent assembly of the people. In making this pact, they make a mutual delegation of power without ever violating the law, thanks to his sense (what a miracle it is his “duty” to maintain the people in peace so as to spare it the horrors of the state of war and fear of him. A Prince bound to his people’s duty to protect it from the state of war, nothing other than the promise—responsible to him in everything, even in the realm of ideology, first to think, if that is possible, ideologically. It is here that we find all the originality of a thinker (his conclusions were correct, Descartes would later say: his reasoning was a theoretician, whom no one understood. He thought (this privilege of thinking, tossing about what people will say, or about reputation; in reasoning in absolute solitude.)

Yet these appalling men are also men;
that every war was a preventative war, that no one had any recourse against the Other he might some day face than to “get the jump on him.” Hobbes thought (and with what audacity!) that all power is absolute, that to be absolute is the essence of power, and that everything which exceeds this rule by however little, whether from the Right or the Left, should be opposed with the greatest possible rigor. He did not think all this with a view to justifying what people would today call—using a word blurs all distinctions, and therefore all meaning and all thought—“totalitarianism” or “estatism”; he thought all this in the interests of free economic competition, and the free development of trade and the culture of the peoples!

For, on closer inspection, it turns out that his notorious totalitarian state is almost already comparable to Marx’s, which must wither away. Since all war, and therefore all terror, are preventive, it was sufficient for this terrible state to exist, in order, as it were, to be so thoroughly absorbed by its own existence as not to have to exist. People have talked about the fear of the gendarme and the need to “make a show of one’s force so as not to have to make use of it” (Lyautey); today we talk about not making a show of one’s (atomic) force so as not to have to make use of it. This is to say that Force is a myth which, as such, acts on the imagination of men and peoples preventively, in the absence of any reason to employ it. I know that I am here extending an argument that never went this far, but I remain within the logic of Hobbe’s thought, and am accounting for his paradoxes in terms of a Logic that remains his.

Be that as it may, it is painfully clear that Hobbes was not the monster that he has been made out to be, and that his sole ambition was to contribute to securing the conditions of viability and development of a world which was what it was, his own world, that of the Renaissance, then opening itself up to the monumental discovery of another, the New World. To be sure, the “hold” of the atomized individuals was not of the same nature or as powerful as in Epicurus and Machiavelli; and Hobbes, unfortunately for us, was no historian, although he lived through so much history (these are not vocations that one can acquire by simple decree.) Yet, in his way, he had arrived at the same result as

A genealogy of values, morality, asceticism or whatever, must confound itself with a quest for their inaccessibility, the vicissitudes of history, to remove the details and accidents that account for Force, once unmasked, as the face of things go, it will not be reticent—in “excavating” these elements to escape from a lab, detained them. The genealogist needs the events of history, its surprising unpalatable defeats—the basis of all beings. Similarly, he must be able to diagnose conditions of weakness and strength, to be in a position to judge philosophically a concrete body of a development, with its extended periods of feverish agitation, a metaphysician would seek its soul in the
fundamental to man’s nature or at the root of his attachment to being and truth. What is found at the historical beginning of things is not the inviolable identity of their origin; it is the dissension of other things. It is disparity.14

History also teaches how to laugh at the solemnities of the origin. The lofty origin is no more than “a metaphysical extension, which arises from the belief that things are most precious and essential at the moment of birth.”15 We tend to think that this is the moment of their greatest perfection, when they emerged dazzling from the hands of a creator or in the shadowless light of a first morning. The origin always precedes the Fall. It comes before the body, before the world and time; it is associated with the gods, and its story is always sung as a theogony. But historical beginnings are lowly: not in the sense of modest or discreet like the steps of a dove, but derisive and ironic, capable of undoing every infatuation. “We wished to awaken the feeling of man’s sovereignty by showing his divine birth: this path is now forbidden, since a monkey stands at the entrance.”16 Man originated with a grimace over his future development; and Zarathustra himself is plagued by a monkey who jumps along behind him, pulling on his coattails.

The final postulate of the origin is linked to the first two in being the site of truth. From the vantage point of an absolute distance, free from the restraints of positive knowledge, the origin makes possible a field of knowledge whose function is to recover it, but always in a false recognition due to the excesses of its own speech. The origin lies at a place of inevitable loss, the point where the truth of things corresponded to a truthful discourse, the site of a fleeting articulation that discourse has obscured and finally lost. It is a new cruelty of history that compels a reversal of this relationship and the abandonment of “adolescent” quests: behind the always recent, avaricious, and measured truth, it posits the ancient proliferation of errors. It is now impossible to believe that “in the rending of the veil, truth remains truthful; we have lived long enough not to be taken in.”17 Truth is undoubtedly the sort of error that cannot be refuted because it was hardened into an unalterable form in the long baking process of history.18 Moreover, the very question of truth, the right it appropriates to re-
finite void of the forest. As a rule, when two people do encounter one another, they merely cross paths at a greater or lesser distance without noticing each other, and the encounter does not even take place. The forest is the equivalent of the Epicuran void in which the parallel rain of the atoms falls: it is a pseudo-Brownian void in which individuals cross each other’s paths, that is to say, do not meet, except in brief conjunctions that do not last. In this way, Rousseau seeks to represent, at a very high price (the absence of children) a radical absence of society prior to all society; and—condition of possibility for all society—the radical absence of society that constitutes the essence of any possible society. That the radical absence of society constitutes the essence of all society is an audacious thesis, the radical nature of which escaped not only Rousseau’s contemporaries, but many of his later critics as well.

For a society to be, what is required? The state of encounter has to be imposed on people; the infinity of the forest, as a condition of possibility for the non-encounter, has to be reduced to the finite by external causes; natural catastrophes have to divide it up into confined spaces, for example islands, where men forced to have encounters and forced to have encounters that last: forced by a force superior to them. I leave to one side the ingenuity of those natural catastrophes that affect the surface of the earth—the simplest of which is the very slight, the infinitesimal, tilt of the equator from the ecliptic, an accident without cause akin to the clinamen—in order to discuss their effects. Once men are forced to make encounters and found associations which, in fact, last, constrained relationships spring up among them, social relationships that are rudimentary at first, and then are reinforced by the effects that these encounters have on the their human nature.

A long, slow dialectic comes into play at this point; in it, with the accumulation of time, forced contacts produce language, the passions, and amorous exchanges or struggle between men: such struggle eventually leads to the state of war. Society is born, the state of nature is born, and war as well. Along with them, there develops a process of accumulation and change that literally creates socialized human nature. It should be noted that it would be possible for this encounter not to last if the

ment with this question: he recalls the previous philosophy, when he questioned if God is needed. He now finds this view of nihilism characterizes it as a search for Ursprung, the same term to summarize Paul Ricoe’s account of the analyses that are characteristically Nietzsche’s. Here, he speaks of the word Herkunft cannot be arbitrated in a number of texts, beginning with Human, All Too Human. Here, he speaks of with the origin of morality, asceticism, yet, the word used in all these works has been for the last time that at this point in the Genealogy Nietzsche reverts, in the final paragraphs, to a position between Herkunft and Ursprung. But immediately following the use of this sense, Nietzsche reverts, in the final paragraphs, to a position that is neutral and equivalent.

Why does Nietzsche challenge the pursuit of those occasions when he is true, it is an attempt to capture the exact essences, and their carefully protected identity, the existence of immobile forms of accident and succession. This search already there,” the image of a primordial nature, and it necessitates the removal of close an original identity. However, if he tends his faith in metaphysics, if he listens, is “something altogether different” between the essential secret, but the secret that the essence was fabricated in a piecemeal manner. Examining the history of reason, he learned the essential secret of their reciprocal hatred, their fanatical spirit of competition—the people the weapons of reason. Further, general concept of liberty is an “invention of
pean monuments are constructed from “discreet and apparently insignificant truths and according to a rigorous method”; they cannot be the product of “large and well meaning errors.” In short, genealogy demands relentless erudition. Genealogy does not oppose itself to history as the lofty and profound gaze of the philosopher might compare to the molelike perspective of the scholar; on the contrary, it rejects the meta-historical deployment of ideal significations and indefinite teleologies. It opposes itself to the search for “origins”.

2. In Nietzsche, we find two uses of the word Ursprung. The first is unstressed, and it is found alternately with other terms such as Entstehung, Herkunft, Abkunft, Geburt. In The Genealogy of Morals, for example, Entstehung or Ursprung serve equally well to denote the origin of duty or guilty conscience; and in the discussion of logic or knowledge in The Gay Science, their origin is indiscriminately referred to as Ursprung, Entstehung, or Herkunft.

The other use of the word is stressed. On occasion, Nietzsche places the term in opposition to another: in the first paragraph of Human, All Too Human the miraculous origin (Wunderursprung) sought by metaphysics is set against the analyses of historical philosophy, which poses questions über Herkunft und Anfang. Ursprung is also used in an ironic and deceptive manner.

In what, for instance, do we find the original basis (Ursprung) of morality, a foundation sought after since Plato? “In detestable, narrowminded conclusions. Pudenda origo.” Or in a related context, where should we seek the origin of religion (Ursprung), which Schopenhauer located in a particular metaphysical sentiment of the hereafter? It belongs, very simply, to an invention (Erfindung), a sleight of hand, formula, in the rituals of black magic, in the work of the Schwarzkünstler.

One of the most significant texts with respect to the use of all these terms and to the variations in the use of Ursprung is the preface to the Genealogy. At the beginning of the text, its objective is defined as an examination of the origin of moral preconceptions and the term used is Herkunft. Then, Nietzsche proceeds by retracing his personal involve-

No doubt man in the state of pure nature, as it were, no soul, carries within himself all that he is and all that will happen to him; to speak, the abstraction and transcendence for all anticipation of all development, perhaps more important: pity, which, as the theory to bear the suffering of one’s fellow man’s absence (societe par manque), hence latent spiritual in the isolated man, athirst for the Othe, this, which is posed from the beginning, is not active there, has no existence or effect of the future that awaits man. Just as spirit it is constituted come about behind man’s active involvement, so both perfectibility and anticipation of this future, in which

There have been studies of the genealogy (schmidt’s book is definitive), but the second Discourse by the theory of the abyme with the powerful, who are also the “most true meaning of the Social Contract, only under the constant threat of the abime [abime] in the Confessions) represents necessary, but against the background of the state of nature, an organism haunted by force concluded with the obedience of the powerful, who are also the “most
to the second *Discourse*, an academic difficulty whose only equivalent in the history of Western culture is the absurd question as to whether Machiavelli was a monarchist or a republican.

...By the same token, it would clarify the status of the texts in which Rousseau ventures to legislate for the peoples (the Corsican people, the Poles, and so on) by reviving, in all its force, the concept that dominates in Machiavelli—he does not utter the word, but this hardly matters, since the thing is present: the concept of the *conjuncture*. To give men laws, one must take full account of the way the *conditions* present themselves, of the surrounding circumstances, of the “there is” this and not that, as, allegorically, one must take account of the climate and many other conditions in Montesquieu, of these conditions and their history, that is to say, of their “having come about”—in short, of the encounters which might not have taken place (compare the state of nature: “that state that might never have arisen”) and which have taken place, shaping the “given” of the problem and its state. What does this signify, if not an attempt to think not only the contingency of necessity, but also the necessity of the contingency at its root? The social contract then no longer appears as a utopia, but as the inner law of any society, in its legitimate or illegitimate form, and the real problem becomes: *how does it happen that one never rectifies an illegitimate (the prevailing) form, transforming it into a legitimate form?* At the limit, the legitimate form does not exist, but one has to postulate it in order to think the existing concrete forms: those Spinozist “singular essences”, whether individuals, conjectures, real states or their peoples—one has to postulate it as the transcendental condition for any condition, that is, any *history*.

The most profound thing in Rousseau is doubtless disclosed and covered back up [*decouvert et recouvert*] here, in this vision of any possible theory of history, which thinks the contingency of necessity as an effect of the necessity of contingency, an unsettling pair of concepts that must nevertheless be taken into account. They make themselves felt in Montesquieu and are explicitly postulated in Rousseau, as an intuition of the eighteenth century that refutes in advance all the teleologies of history which tempted it, and for which it cleared a broad path under the irresistible impulsion of the French Revolution. To put

1. Genealogy is gray, meticulous, operates on a field of entangled and comments that have been scratched over and

On this basis, it is obvious that Paul Re...
The allusion is to the Renault Plant in Sandouville, in Normandy.

Presumably a slip for “exploitation.” [Trans.]

We have reproduced the original version of the following passage here, because the changes Althusser made in it so as to incorporate it into his projected book (see note 63 above) yielded a patently unsatisfactory result. “We” in Althusser’s text doubtless means the authors of *Reading Capital*.

Let us hazard one last remark, which it is perhaps no accident that this curious dubbing above all, men who sought, in the conjecture, a means with which to think not above all, the reality of *politics*, not only above all, the essence of *practice*, and the possibilities in their *encounter in struggle* (I say (Hobbes, Rousseau). This struggle was (Hegel), but also, and well before Hegel, that is known as competition or, when struggle (and its “contradiction”). Is there whose behalf Spinoza speaks when he only to think Machiavelli’s thought, and practice, to think practice via that thought.

All these historical remarks are just a partial attention to in Marx. They are not, to attest that, from Epicurus to Marx, even if it was covered over (by its very own, especially, by denial and repression, with actions that cost some their lives)—the “creation that sought its materialist anchorage (and therefore in a more or less atomistic “fall”, being the simplest figure of interpretation’s radical rejection of all philosophies, *Wesen*), that is, of Reason (*Logos, Ratio*, Origin and End—the Origin being nothing but the separation of the End in Reason or primordial of Order, whether it be rational, moral...
interests of a philosophy which, rejecting the Whole and every Order, rejects the Whole and order in favor of dispersion (Derrida would say, in his terminology, “dissemination”) and disorder.

To say that in the beginning was nothingness or disorder is to take up a position prior to any assembling and ordering, and to give up thinking the origin as Reason or End in order to think it as nothingness. To the old question “What is the origin of the world?”, this materialist philosophy answers: “Nothingness!”, “Nothing,” “I start out from nothing,” “There is no obligatory beginning of philosophy,” “philosophy does not start out from a beginning that is its origin;” on the contrary, it “catches a moving train,” and, by sheer strength of arm, “hoists itself aboard the train” that has been running for all eternity in front of it, like Heraclitus’ river. Hence there is no end, either of the world, or of history, or of philosophy, or of morality, or of art or politics, and so on. These themes, which from Nietzsche to Deleuze and Derrida, from English empiricism (Deleuze) to (with Derrida’s help) Heidegger, have become familiar to us by now, are fertile for any understanding not only of philosophy, but also all its supposed “objects” (whether science, culture, art, literature, or any other expression of existence.) They are crucial to this materialism of the encounter, however well disguised they may be in the form of other concepts. Today we are capable of translating them into plainer language.

We shall say that the materialism of the encounter has been christened “materialism” only provisionally, in order to bring out its radical opposition to any idealism of consciousness or reason, whatever its destination. We shall further say that the materialism of the encounter turns on a certain interpretation of the single proposition there is (es gibt, Heidegger) and is developments or implications, namely: “there is = there is nothing”; “there is” = “there has always-already been nothing”, that is to say, “something”, the “always-already”, or which I have made abundant use in my essays until now although this has not always been noticed—since the always-whatever is the grip in German; Begriff: grasp [prise] in this antecedence of each thing over itself, hence every kind of origin. We shall say, then, that the materialism of the encounter is contained in the thesis of the primacy of
empty space of their indetermination like the drops of rain that have encountered each other only in man, in the assignable, but minute parallelism of thought and the body.”

22. E II, A 2. [Trans.]
23. E II, P 40, S 2. [Trans.]
24. E I, Appendix, p. 74: “This doctrine concerning the end turns Nature completely upside down. For what is really a cause, it considers as an effect, and conversely.” Elsewhere, Althusser translates Spinoza’s phrase *tota illa fabrica*, which occurs in the Appendix to Book I of the *Ethics* shortly before the sentence just quoted, as “an entire “apparatus””, likening it to his own concept of the “Ideological State Apparatus”. [Trans.]

If we were to push these theses further, we would outline a number of concepts that would, since they would be the concepts of philosophy has no object, would make this point to the point of rendering it unrecognizable (which is why it was, in the last analysis anticipated.) To illustrate these theses, we would note in passing, did not incident, these incendiaries of every philosophy, the greatest (which must be the history of philosophy), the following:

“Die Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist” (Wittgenstein), the thing that “falls”, everything that “comes to be”, that is the case”—by case, let us understand *chance*, that which comes about in the now yet of being.
Thus, as far back as we can go, “there is” = “there has always been”, there “has-always-already-been”, the “already” being absolutely necessary in order to mark this priority of the occurrence, of the Fall, over all its forms, that is to say, all the forms of beings. This is Heidegger’s es gibt, the inaugural deal [la donne] (rather than what has been dealt out [le donne], depending on whether one wishes to highlight the active or passive aspect); it is always prior to its presence. In other words, it is the primacy of absence over presence (Derrida), not as a going-back-towards, but as a horizon receding endlessly ahead of the walker who, seeking his path on the plain, never finds anything but another plain stretching out before him (very different from the Cartesian walker who has only to walk straight ahead in a forest in order to get out of it), because the world is made up, alternatively, of virgin forests and forests that have been cleared to create open fields: without Holzwege.

In this “world” without being or history (like Rousseau’s forest), what happens? For there are occurrences there, taking this phrase in the impersonal, active/passive sense [car il y advient: “il”, actif/passif impersonnel.] Encounters. What happens there is what happens in Epicurus’ universal rain, prior to any world, any being and any reason as well as any cause. What happens is that “there are encounters” [ca se rencontre]; in Heidegger, that “things are thrown” in an inaugural “destining.” Whether or not it is by the miracle of the clinamen, it is enough to know that it comes about “we know not where, we know not when”, and that it is “the smallest deviation possible”, that is, the assignable nothingness of all swerve. Lucretius’ text is clear enough to designate that which nothing in the world can designate, although it is the origin of every world. In the “nothingness” of the swerve, there occurs an encounter between one atom and another, and this event [evenement] becomes advent [avenement] on condition of the parallelism of the atoms, for it is this parallelism which, violated on just one occasion, induces the gigantic pile-up and collision-interlocking [accrochage] of an infinite number of atoms, from which a world is born, (one world or another: hence the plurality of possible worlds, and the fact that the concept of possibility can be rooted in the concept of original disorder.)
what makes it such-and-such, is the *mode of domination* of the structure over its elements. Thus, in the feudal mode of production, it is the *structure of dependence* which imposes its signification on the elements: possession of the manor, including the serfs who work on it, possession of the collective instruments (the mill, the farmland, etc.) by the lord, the subordinate role of money, except when, later, pecuniary relations are imposed on everyone. Thus, in the capitalist mode of production, it is the structure of exploitation that is imposed on all the elements, the subordination of the means of production and the productive forces to the process of exploitation, the exploitation of the workers stripped of the means of production, the monopoly of the means of production in the hands of the capitalist class, and so forth.

Notes

a. This is why Dominique Lecourt is right to advance the term “sur-materialism” in connection with Marx, in a remarkable work that has naturally been ignored by a University accustomed to responding with contempt whenever it feels that “a point has been scored against it” (see *L’Ordre et les jeux*, Paris, 1981, last part).


c. See the fine and very successful conference on Darwin recently organized in Chantilly by Dominique Lecourt and Yvette Conry [Conry, ed., *De Darwin au Darwinisme: Science et ideologie*, Paris, 1983].


g. [Albert] Soboul [1914-82] stubbornly devoted the whole of his short life to trying to prove this.

1. See Nicholas Malebranch, *A Treatise of Nature and Grace*, trans. Anon., London, 1695, p. 22, translation modified: “I use the examples of the irregularity of ordinary rain to ready the soul for another rain, which is not given to the merits of men, no more than the common rain which falls equally upon lands that are sown, as well as those that lie fallow.”

2. Althusser intended to insert a note here. It would probably have been a ref-

Whence the form of order and the form of by this pile-up, determined as they are rather; whence, once the encounter has brought the primacy of the structure over its elements that come into play in the encounter “slide-interlock” [accrohabilibite], in order that is to say “take form,” at last give birth to water “takes hold” when ice is there with it curdles, or mayonnaise when it emulsifies “nothing” over all “form,” and of also to as “hooked”, that is, susceptible to come into play, and all eternity, irrevocably, for

Once they have thus “taken hold” or “clasp,” enter the realm of Being that they inadequately assignable, distinct, localizable beings of property (depending on the time and place) to them a structure of Beings or of the elements its place, meaning and role, or h-ments of...” (the atoms as elements of being in such a way that the atoms, far from being merely the secondary consequence of ornement et avenement]. If we are to talk and in this way, it is necessary that the world ex- oms exist, a situation which puts discou- place, and also puts in second place (not first philosophy of Being—thus making forever therefore explicable: see the appendix which repeats nearly verbatim the critique of Democritus, and perhaps even in Epicurus) any discourse of *first place* (which explains why Epicurus, who knew the “mechanical” materialism of Democritus...
a resurgence, within a possible philosophy of the encounter, of the dominant idealism of Order as immanent in Disorder.)

Once these principles have been set out, the rest follows naturally, if I may be forgiven the expression.\textsuperscript{50}

1. For a being (a body, an animal, a man, state, or Prince) to be, an encounter has to have taken place (past infinitive). To limit ourselves to Machiavelli, an encounter has to have taken place between beings with affinities [des affinissables]; between such-and-such an individual and such-and-such a conjecture, or Fortune, for example—the conjunction itself being junction, con-junction, congealed (albeit shifting) encounter, since it has already taken place, and refers in its turn to the infinite number of its prior causes, just as (let us add) a determinate [défini] individual (for instance, Borgia) refers to the infinite sequence [suite] or prior causes of which it is the result.

2. There are encounters only between series [series] of beings that are the results of several series of causes—at least two, but this two soon proliferates, by virtue of the effect of parallelism or general contagion (as Breton puts it, profoundly, “elephants are contagious.”\textsuperscript{b}) One also thinks here of Cournot, a great but neglected thinker.

3. Every encounter is aleatory, not only in its origins (nothing ever guarantees an encounter), but also in its effects. In other words, every encounter might not have taken place, although it did take place; but its possible nonexistence sheds light on the meaning of its aleatory being. And every encounter is aleatory in its effects, in that nothing in the elements of the encounter prefigures, before the actual encounter, the contours and determinations of the being that will emerge from it. Julius II did not know that he was harboring his mortal enemy in his Romagnol breast, nor did he know that his mortal enemy would be lying at death’s door, and so find himself outside of history [hors histoire] at the critical hour of Fortune, only to go off and die in an obscure Spain before the walls of an unknown castle.\textsuperscript{51} This means that no determination of the being which issues from the “taking-hold” of the encounter is prefigured even in outline, in the being of the elements that converge in the encounter. Quite the contrary:

\textsuperscript{50} The word “bourgeois” has a pertinent utilization of the adjective “bourgeois.”

\textsuperscript{b} To understand in for the concept of pure negativity.

\textsuperscript{51} This is a combination (Balibar), that of the means of production. To pursue this analysis, elements in it, “productive forces, means of production, nature, men, etc.” What then comprises a combination which subjects the production into existence, the capitulation of thinking the fact to be accomplished, and himself within the accomplished fact, and the laws of its necessity.

Following Marx, we\textsuperscript{59} defined a mode of production (Balibar), that of the means of production. To pursue this analysis, the owners of the means of production, the producers (to the domination of the owners of the means of production is essential [est d’essence], is essential to any aleatory encounter is lacking, for the unity primitive to unify all the other elements of the mode of production into existence, the capitulation of thinking the fact to be accomplished, and himself within the accomplished fact, and the laws of its necessity.
established itself firmly in France. Above all, given that the bourgeoisie is said to be the product of the feudal mode of production, what proves that it was not a class of the feudal mode of production, and a sign of the reinforcement rather than the decay of this mode? These mysteries in Capital both revolve around the same object: money and mercantile capitalism on the one hand, and, on the other, the nature of the bourgeoisie, said to be its support and beneficiary.

If, to define capital, one contents oneself with talking, as Marx does, about an accumulation of money that produces a surplus—a money profit \( M'' = M + M' \)—then it is possible to speak of money and mercantile capitalism. But these are capitalisms without capitalists, capitalisms without exploitation of a labor force, capitalisms in which exchange\(^59\) more or less takes the form of a levy governed not by the law of value, but by practices of pillage, either direct or indirect. Consequently, it is here that we encounter the great question of the bourgeoisie.

Marx’s solution is simple and disarming. The bourgeoisie is produced as an antagonistic class by the decay of the dominant feudal class. Here we find the schema of dialectical production again, a contrary producing its contrary. We also find the dialectical thesis of negation, a contrary naturally being required, by virtue of a conceptual necessity, to replace its contrary and become dominant in its turn. But what if this was not how things happened? What if the bourgeoisie, far from being the contrary product of the feudal class, was its culmination and, as it were, acme, its highest form and, so to speak, crowning perfection? This would enable us to resolve many problems which are so many dead ends, especially the problems of the bourgeois revolutions, such as the French Revolution, which are supposed, come hell or high water, to be capitalist,\(^6\) yet are not; and a number of other problems that are so many mysteries: what is this strange class—capitalist by virtue of its future, but formed well before any kind of capitalism, under feudalism—known as the bourgeoisie?

Just as there is not, in Marx, a satisfactory theory of the so-called mercantile mode of production, nor, a fortiori, of merchant (and money) capital, so there is no satisfactory theory of the bourgeoisie in Marx—except-no determination of these elements coming backwards from the result to its becoming necessary (Hegel), we must therefore say that there can be no determination of these elements except as determined by the result of the encounter itself (Canguilhem). That is, instead of the modality of necessity, or an exception to it, we are encountering the becoming-necessary of the encounter that not only the world of life (the biohistory), but Darwin, have recently become aware of. History, too, at certain felicitous moments, figures combined in an encounter that happens that there are aleatory men or “living” death bestowed or received, as well as figures of the world to which the original aleatory has given their form (Antiquity, the Enlightenment, etc.) This means who took it into his head to consider junctures or States of the world as either premises or the provisional anticipation of them, because he would be neglecting the provisional results are doubly provisional be superseded, but also in that they might have come about only as the effect they had not arisen on the happy basis which gave their “chance” to “last” to conjunction it so happens (by chance that shows that we are not—that we do not descend it, from its origins to its term), that since this meaning emerges from an encounter in which things take hold. But from this there follow very important things of the word “law”. It will be granted an encounter in which things take hold. But
encounter has taken hold—that is, once the stable figure of the world, of the only existing world (for the advent of a given world obvious excludes all the other possible combinations), has been constituted—we have to do with a stable world in which events, in their succession [suite], obey “laws”. Hence it does not much matter whether the world, our world, (we know of no other; of the infinity of possible attributes, we know only two, the understanding and space: “Faktum”, Spinoza might have said), emerged from the encounter of atoms falling in the Epicurean rain of the void, or from the “Big Bang” hypothesized by the astrophysicists. The fact is that we have to do with this world and not another. The fact is that this world “plays by the rules” [est regulier] (in the sense in which one says that an honest player does: for this world plays and—no mistake about it—plays with us), that it is subject to rules and obeys laws. Hence the very great temptation, even for those who are willing to grant the premises of this materialism of the encounter, of resorting, once the encounter has “taken hold”, to the study of the laws which derive from this taking-hold of forms, and repeat these forms to all intents and purposes, indefinitely. For it is also a fact, a Faktum, that there is order in this world, and that knowledge of this world comes by way of knowledge of its “laws” (Newton) and the conditions of possibility, not of existence of these laws, but only of knowledge of them. This is, to be sure, a way of indefinitely deferring the old question of the origin of the world (this is how Kant proceeds), but only in order to obscure all the more effectively the origin of the second encounter that makes possible knowledge of the first in this world (the encounter between concepts and things).

Well, we are going to resist this temptation by defending a thesis dear to Rousseau, who maintained that the contract is based on an “abyss”—by defending the idea, therefore, that the necessity of the laws that issue from the taking-hold induced by the encounter is, even at its most stable, haunted by a radical instability, which explains something we find it very hard to grasp (for it does violence to our sense of “what is seemly”): that laws can change—not that they can be valid for a time but not eternally (in his critique of classical political economy, Marx went that far, as his “Russian critic” had well understood, arguing that every historical period has its laws, although he went no further, there are indeed things in Marx that whenever he cedes to the other conception: a concept that is totalitarian, teleological.

In this case, we are clearly dealing with something above, but so thought and ordered as to be all eternity destined to enter into combination, and another, and reciprocally produce each other conditions, and/or complements. On this leaves the aleatory nature of the “encounter,” one side in order to think solely in terms of and, consequently, its predestination. On this not an independent history, but a history of adapting to the other histories, history endlessly reproduces its own [propre] elements. This explains why Marx and Engels a “product of big industry”, “a product fusing the production of the proletariat with an extended scale, as if the capitalist mode of its essential elements, an expropriated histories no longer float in history, like so many a history of an “encounter” that might not take place in advance; the structure precedes order to reproduce the structure.

What holds for primitive accumulation of money. Where do they come from in it? From mercantile capitalism, as he says expression that has spawned many an abortive mode of production.” From usury? From colonial pillage? Ultimately, this purposes, even if it is of special importance: the result: the fact that they exist. Marx, however, the thesis of a mythical “decay” of the feudal bourgeoisie from the heart of this decay, what proves that the feudal mode of production then eventually disappears? It was not un...
I am repeating myself, but I must: what is remarkable about the first conception, apart from the explicit theory of the encounter, is the idea that every mode of production comprises elements that are independent of each other, each resulting from its own specific history, in the absence of any organic, teleological relation between these diverse histories. This conception culminates in the theory of primitive accumulation, from which Marx, taking his inspiration from Engels, drew a magnificent chapter of Capital, the true heart of the book. Here we witness the emergence of a historical phenomenon whose result we know—the expropriation of the means of production from an entire rural population in Great Britain—but whose causes bear no relation to the result and its effects. Was the aim to create extensive domains for the hunt? Or endless fields for sheep-raising? We do not know just what the main reason for this process of violent dispossession was (it was most likely the sheep) and, especially, the main reason for the violence of it; moreover, it doesn’t much matter. The fact is that this process took place, culminating in a result that was promptly diverted from its possible, presumed end by “owners of money” looking for impoverished manpower. This diversion is the mark of the non-teleology of the process and of the incorporation of its result into a process that both made it possible and was wholly foreign to it.

It would, moreover, be a mistake to think that this process of the aleatory encounter was confined to the English fourteenth century. It has always gone on, and is going on even today—not only in the countries of the Third World [sic], which provide the most striking example of it, but also in France, by way of the dispossession of agricultural producers and their transformation into semi-skilled workers (consider Sandouville: Breton’s running machines)—as a permanent process that puts the aleatory at the heart of the survival and reinforcement of the capitalist “mode of production”, and also, let us add, at the heart of the so-called socialist “mode of production” itself. Here Marxist scholars untiringly rehearse Marx’s fantasy, thinking the reproduction of the proletariat in the mistaken belief that they are thinking its production; thinking in the accomplished fact when they think they are thinking in its becoming-accomplished.

as we shall see), but that they can change the aleatory basis that sustains them, and that is, without an intelligible end. This can be no taking-hold without surprise) [il n’est pas lieu de parler de la prise en possession du hasard] (Nietzsche, Artuad). No one is one of the basic features of the history of the relation that makes an unknown man, or both at once: when Holderlin’s, the world conjointly; when the French triumphs down to the march of Napoleon’s windows at Jena; when the Commune in 1871 explodes in Russia, or, a fortiori, whenever does, a revolution in which, truly, almost loosed over vast spaces, although the like the 13th of May, when the workers have “joined up” (what a result would have their long parallel demonstrations cross at all costs, joining up, conjoining, uniting still forever unprecedented (the rain in

To give some sense of the underground of the encounter, which is very important by a (philosophical) materialism of the mode of production. No one can concept, which serves not only to think also to periodize the history of social fiction of history.

In fact, we find two absolutely unrelated production in Marx.
The first goes back to Engels’ *Condition of the Working-Class in England*; its real inventor was Engels. It recurs in the famous chapter on primitive accumulation, the working-day, and so on, and in a host of minor allusions, to which I shall return, if possible. It may also be found in the theory of the Asiatic mode of production. The second is found in the great passages of *Capital* on the essence of capitalism, as well as the essence of the feudal and socialist modes of production, and on the revolution; and, more generally, in the “theory” of the transition, or form of passage, from one mode of production to another. The things that have been written on the “transition” from capitalism to communism over the past twenty years beggar the imagination and are past all counting!

In untold passages, Marx—this is certainly no accident—explains that the capitalist mode of production arose from the “encounter” between “the owners of money” and the proletarian stripped of everything but his labor-power. “It so happens” that this encounter took place, and “took hold”, which means that it did not come undone as soon as it came about, but *lasted*, and became an accomplished fact, the accomplished fact of this encounter, inducing stable relationships and a necessity the study of which yields “laws”—tendential laws, of course: the laws of the development of the capitalist mode of production (the law of value, the law of exchange, the law of cyclical crises, the law of the crisis and decay of the capitalist mode of production, the law of the passage—transition—to the socialist mode of production under the laws of the class struggle, and so on.) What matters about this conception is less the elaboration of laws, hence of an essence, than the aleatory character of the “taking-hold” of this encounter, which gives rise to an accomplished fact whose laws it is possible to state.

This can be put differently: the whole that results from the “taking-hold” of the “encounter” does not precede the “taking-hold” of its elements, but follows it; for this reason, it might not have “taken hold”, and, *a fortiori*, “the encounter might not have taken place.” All this is said—in veiled terms, to be sure, but it is said—in the formula that Marx uses in his frequent discussions of the “encounter” [das Vorgefunden] between raw labor-power and the owners of money. We can go even further, and suppose that this history before taking hold in the West, but, a faible arrangement of the elements, failed the fourteenth-century and fourteenth-century, where there were certainly men who could energy (machines driven by the hydraul as manpower (unemployed artisans), but, 35 nevertheless failed to “take hold”. What we (perhaps, this is a hypothesis) that while seeking in the form of his appeal for a capable of absorbing what might have been.

The slightest reflection on the presuppositions of the “elements” of capitalism and Engels, shows that it is predicated on a relationship between the structure and the elements supposed to unify. For what is a mode of production? A composition (tools, machines, an experience of workers), an accumulation of the raw material and an accumulation of producers (product of production.) The elements do not exist in isolation. For what is a mode of production? They exist in their “accumulation” and “composition” and its own history, and none being the tel or their history. When Marx and Engels utter “a product of big industry”, they utter a positioning themselves within the logic of production of the proletariat on an extended scale, “encounter” which produces (rather than the proletariat, this mass of impoverished, expelling the elements making up the mode of production)” and Engels shift from the first conception, a historico-aleatory conception, to a second philosophical.